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Alina Shcherbakova and Denis Shcherbakov
This article examines the state of the global food problem, food security in East Asia, 
and the opportunity for Russia to prevent a food deficit in North Korea. The authors 
analyze the symptoms of the global food problem, the theoretical approaches to 
food security, the transformation of food consumption in Asia, and the food trade 
between Russia and the Korean Peninsula. One major conclusion is that Russia 
is in the best position among all c ountries to increase food exports to Asia—and 
especially to North Korea—as the people of Asia’s food consumption habits shape 
the new structure of food trade between that region and the rest of the world.
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Introduction
Nobody doubts that the food deficit is one of the major problems humanity now 
faces, as free access to food is among the paramount needs of every person on 
earth. It is no wonder, then, that this vitally important physical requirement is 
found at the most basic level of Abram Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow 
1943). 
This article studies shifts in food supply and demand on the global food 
market and food consumption dynamics in Asia in recent decades. It also 
examines the connection between the food problem and food security and asks 
whether one country can serve as a guarantor of food security for another—or 
even for a region.
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The Global Food Problem: The Overall Picture
The potential food deficit is considered the world’s oldest problem because it is 
has been the focus of discussion for two centuries. However, it appears that the 
price of solving the global food problem will be significantly higher in the twenty-
first century than it was before. The symptoms of the global food problem have 
existed for a long time. Had this phenomenon appeared only in the twenty-first 
century, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) would not have not been 
founded when it was and the well-known Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972) 
would not have been written in 1972, and so on. However, it has become clear 
in the early twenty-first century that food prices are rising and that a new Green 
Revolution is unlikely. 
There are many theoretical definitions of the global food problem, but this 
article will use only one: the unprecedented rise of world food prices that causes 
starvation among the poor people of most countries (Figure 1). Former World 
Economic Forum Vice Chairperson Josette Sheeran gave this striking description 
of the global food problem: “In spite of the fact that food production is rising, 
there are now more starving people in the word. We put food on supermarket 
shelves, but the people cannot afford it” (Grain 2008, 7).
As we have already mentioned, the global food problem is not new, but two 
radical changes occurred in the twenty-first century: awareness of poverty has 
increased and signs indicate that local food crises will become more frequent 
(Serova 2012).
Thus, the food problem is not a question of whether our planet can provide 
a sufficient amount of food to feed its growing population, but whether it can 
Figure 1. Food Price Index, 1960-2016
Source: UNCTAD (2017)
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produce the foods that are most needed at prices everyone can afford. The United 
Nations (UN) predicts that food prices will double over the next twenty years. 
Compared to historical trends, food commodity prices are projected to fall back 
to a more stable but relatively higher level (Babcock 2008).
In addition to rising prices, the second source of evidence of the global food 
problem is the growing food trade deficit in most regions of the world. According 
to the FAO, developed countries and developing countries are increasingly 
dependent on cereal and meat imports. Moreover, the trade deficit can be 
observed in developed countries. Even the United States, one of the major food 
exporters, overcame its food trade deficit only in the beginning of the twenty-first 
century (FAO 2018). Hence, most countries are dependent on the major food 
exporters, enabling suppliers to dominate the global food market. 
Another phenomenon contributing to the global food problem is so-called 
“agflation” in which food prices rise faster than the price of other commodities. 
From 1960 until 2003, the food prices index was higher than other price indices, 
making food one of the major engines of global inflation (UNCTAD 2017).  
The sources of the global food problem have been studied very thoroughly. 
They include: the increase in global population, the energy intensive nature of 
agricultural activity, the rising demand for biofuels, and the transformation of 
common consumption patterns caused by the rapid industrial development of 
the “Asian giants”—resulting in increases in consumption of meat in accordance 
with Bennett’s Law. This law states that when per capita incomes rise, people 
begin substituting livestock foodstuffs for vegetable products (Regmi, Takeshima, 
and Unnevehr 2008). Thus, as Asian countries began developing rapidly, their 
Figure 2. Asian Food Imports (Unit: Billion USD)
Source: FAO (2018)
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populations begin eating more meat. And to produce meat, they need more 
grains to feed animals. This demand for grain pushes the price of cereals higher. It 
is, thus, obvious that Asia will need to import an ever greater quantity of food to 
satisfy its population (Figure 2).
Additional contributing factors include the world’s limited natural resources, 
climate change, and the deficit of clean water—40 percent of developing Asia is 
projected to face a severe water shortage by 2030 (ADB 2013, 4). These problems 
largely stem from exogenous factors that humanity is practically powerless to 
change. Thus, the only way to avoid aggravating the global food problem is to 
acknowledge these factors and to try to reduce their impact. The global food 
problem is also directly connected to two other global problems: climate change 
and the shortage of potable water. Climate change may affect food systems in 
several ways. These range from directly affecting crop production, to influencing 
markets, food prices, and supply chain infrastructure. The relative importance 
of climate change for food security differs between regions. For example, climate 
is among the most frequently named causes of food insecurity in Asia. Certain 
areas of Asia where rainfall is expected to decline in the future are considered 
vulnerable to climate change (ibid., 21). The consequences of global climate 
change are less straightforward for Russia. On the one hand, higher temperatures 
bring certain economic advantages such as the opportunity to use the Northern 
Sea Route, less expensive development of mineral resources in the northern areas, 
and a certain improvement in the agro-climatic conditions. On the other hand, 
Russia might suffer negative consequences such as a growing number of natural 
calamities, desertification in some southern and western regions, and the possible 
collapse of structures built on permafrost (Likhacheva, Makarov, and Savelyeva 
2010).
The Global Food Problem and Food Security
The other problem arising from the global food problem is food security and 
this takes on paramount importance. The FAO considers food security a global 
phenomenon. According to the FAO, food security exists when all people, at all 
times, have physical and economic access to safe and nutritious food to meet 
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. In this 
context, the FAO defines four aspects of food security: (1) food availability: the 
availability of a sufficient quantity of food of appropriate quality, supplied through 
domestic production or imports (including food aid); (2) food access: access by 
individuals to adequate resources (entitlements) for acquiring appropriate foods 
for a nutritious diet; (3) utilization: utilization of food through adequate diet, 
clean water, sanitation, and health care to reach a state of nutritional well-being 
in which all physiological needs are met; and (4) stability: to be food secure, a 
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population, household, or individual must have access to adequate food at all 
times. There should be no risk of losing access to food as a consequence of sudden 
shocks (e.g. an economic or climatic crisis) or cyclical events (e.g. seasonal food 
insecurity) (FAO 2008). 
In addition to international food security, there is also national food security. 
This can be defined in several ways. Some researchers believe that national 
food security presupposes a regular supply of domestic products, eliminating a 
given country’s dependence on foreign suppliers (Kotenko 2010). Other experts 
contend that national food security does not mean complete self-sufficiency. 
In their opinion, the main criterion is that food is available for all social and 
economic groups of the population—and not only from domestic suppliers. The 
freedom to import also serves as a guarantee of national food security. Thus, we 
can say that the major aim of providing food security is to satisfy each person’s 
requirements, and not only their survival needs. Each person should always have 
an opportunity to get any foodstuff he or she needs to satisfy his or her personal 
requirements. And this definition of food security shows the closest correlation to 
the current conditions of the world economy and policy. 
The point is that, in developed countries, a new gradation of food security 
has recently appeared. This gradation was divided into two parts: food security 
of the state and food security of the population. While the first emphasizes the 
quantity of food, the second focuses on the quality of food and its relevance to 
people’s needs. In this context, the question of self-sufficiency becomes pointless. 
The Transformation of Food Consumption in Asia
The increasing demand for meat represents a major shift in the world food 
market in recent decades, radically altering its condition and structure. The 
increasing consumption of meat products leads to growing demand not only for 
meat, but also for feed, land, electricity, and other goods related to the increased 
production of livestock products. According to Bennett’s Law, as income 
increases, the percentage of protein foods of animal origin in the diet increases. 
However, the indirect per capita consumption of cereals (grains as food + feed for 
cattle breeding) also grows. Thus, the growing world demand for meat entails an 
increasing demand for cereals and other feed plants.
Table 1 contains information about the growth of per capita caloric intake 
by region. It shows a 31 percent global increase in per capita caloric intake, 
54 percent in Asia, and 6 percent in Oceania—indicating a strong correlation 
between caloric content and the income growth rate of the population.
It should be noted that the most tangible increase in the consumption 
of meat products is seen in Asian countries. For developed countries, the 
consumption of large amounts of meat per person has been the norm for many 
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Table 1. Caloric Intake (Unit: kcal/person/day)
World Africa North America
Food Item 1961 2013 Δ% 1961 2013 Δ% 1961 2013 Δ%
Cereals 1086 1292 19% 1062 1284 21% 627 812 30%
Fruits 51 97 90% 78 107 37% 82 120 46%
Oilcrops 38 60 58% 56 63 13% 42 67 60%
Sugar & Sweeteners 193 236 22% 102 161 58% 511 583 14%
Vegetable Oils 113 271 140% 125 208 66% 266 677 155%
Vegetables 44 95 116% 31 48 55% 63 70 11%
Eggs 18 36 100% 4 9 125% 66 55 -17%
Fish, Seafood 17 34 100% 9 20 122% 20 35 75%
Meat 110 237 115% 67 90 34% 331 417 26%
Milk 118 138 17% 51 74 45% 380 351 -8%
Grand Total 2196 2884 31% 1993 2624 32% 2873 3663 27%
South America Asia Europe
Food Item 1961 2013 Δ% 1961 2013 Δ% 1961 2013 Δ%
Cereals 841 967 15% 1116 1422 27% 1226 1007 -18%
Fruits 117 128 9% 28 87 211% 69 110 59%
Oilcrops 24 45 88% 48 68 42% 11 25 127%
Sugar & Sweeteners 388 410 6% 98 170 73% 316 389 23%
Vegetable Oils 112 369 229% 61 215 252% 194 426 120%
Vegetables 28 39 39% 43 119 177% 53 80 51%
Eggs 13 34 162% 8 38 375% 35 50 43%
Fish, Seafood 9 18 100% 15 37 147% 27 47 74%
Meat 202 381 89% 31 220 610% 230 351 53%
Milk 126 213 69% 39 98 151% 263 302 15%
Grand Total 2329 3027 30% 1805 2779 54% 3041 3367 11%
Oceania
Food Item 1961 2013 Δ%
Cereals 807 764 -5%
Fruits 97 109 12%
Oilcrops 44 59 34%
Sugar & Sweeteners 523 399 -24%
Vegetable Oils 68 471 593%
Vegetables 41 75 83%
Eggs 46 32 -30%
Fish, Seafood 21 45 114%
Meat 489 449 -8%
Milk 316 292 -8%
Grand Total 3021 3216 6%
Source: FAO (2018)
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years, so the increase will be minor. (By 2050, residents of North America and 
Europe will eat 89 kg of meat per person per year instead of 83 kg). But in East 
and Southeast Asia, which has recently discovered affordable livestock products, 
the amount of meat consumed by each inhabitant will increase by 23 kg by 
2050—nearly doubling from 28 kg per person per year to 51 kg per person 
per year (Institute of Development Studies 2008). Thus, demand for livestock 
products, primarily meat, is growing most rapidly in Asian countries.
Unlike the “Green Revolution,” the meat revolution was caused by factors 
not from the supply side but from the demand side (Delgado et al. 1999, 1). It 
was caused by the growth of meat consumption in developing countries. So, 
from 1970 to 2000, the caloric intake of meat per person per year grew three 
times more in developing countries than in developed ones. Asia demonstrated 
the most impressive growth in meat consumption, with the number of kcal per 
person per day increasing six-fold between 1961 and 2013.
The fact is that, in developing countries, cereals used to be the traditional 
food due to low per capita income. However, cereals consumption has reached 
maximum saturation, whereas meat consumption in the twenty-first century 
will continue to grow rapidly—mainly due to increased demand in developing 
countries. Developed countries have already reached the maximum consumption 
of meat. And, because the level of meat consumption in developing countries has 
not yet reached the level seen in developed countries, we can expect an even more 
pronounced rise in the demand for meat in developing countries—and especially 
in Asia. 
Healthcare systems in Western countries encouraged people to reduce the 
quantity of red meat (pork and beef) and increase the quantity of white meat 
(chicken and turkey) they consume. In 1983, developing countries accounted for 
36 percent of meat consumption and 34 percent of milk consumption. By 1993, 
this share had risen to 48 percent and 41 percent respectively. In 2013, developing 
countries consumed 69 percent of the world’s meat and 65 percent of its milk.
In countries with an average income of US$ 1,000, a 1 percent increase in per 
capita income would lead to a 1 percent increase in pork consumption, 2 percent 
more chicken consumption, and more than 2 percent more beef (Schroeder, 
Berkley, and Schroeder 1995, 17). When the average level of per capita income 
exceeds US$ 10,000, the increase in the consumption of meat products does not 
exceed 1 percent. This proves that in relatively poor countries, a slight increase 
in income will lead to a more significant rise in meat consumption than would a 
corresponding increase in rich countries. Researchers have also shown that the 
growth rate of meat consumption in poor countries will exceed the growth rate of 
household incomes.
The production of meat has shifted from developed to developing countries 
where the growth rate of production is significantly higher. The production 
of milk is still concentrated in developed countries. Cattle breeding and milk 
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production are concentrated in those regions that are the main consumers of 
these respective products: meat is produced primarily in developed countries and 
Latin America, and milk in Asia where 38 percent of milk was produced in 2014. 
Pig breeding is most common in East and South Asia. But because of inefficient 
production, those regions produced less than half of the world output of meat 
while developing countries produced three-fourths of all cattle and two-thirds of 
all pigs, chicken, sheep, and geese. 
According to forecasts, however, meat consumption in 2000-2020 will grow 
by only about 50 percent beyond its increase in 1980-2000. The reasons for 
this are (Delgado et al. 1999, 21): (1) because per capita meat consumption in 
kilograms during this period is much higher than the previous one, the absolute 
increase will be less; (2) there will be less growth in per capita income and a 
slowdown of urbanization; and (3) meat consumption will reach the saturation 
point.
Despite all these limiting factors, there will be a radical transformation of 
the consumption of meat and milk in the world. In 2020, developing countries 
will account for 62 percent of global meat consumption and 60 percent of all milk 
consumption.
According to forecasts, countries experiencing a deficit of meat will import 
not meat itself, but feedstuffs to produce their own meat products. Thus, the 
production of meat products will shift from developed countries to developing 
ones, and Asia will become not a net exporter of meat but a net importer.
Southeast and East Asia provide the most revealing example of Bennett’s Law. 
There the rapid growth of per capita incomes, urbanization, and globalization 
have led to the replacement of traditional food products (rice and starch-bearing 
root crops) with meat and dairy products (as in developed countries), as well as 
vegetables, fruits, animal, and vegetable fats (Pingalli 2006, 281).  Pingali (ibid.) 
called this phenomenon the “Westernization of the Asian diet.” It is characterized 
by a predominance in the diet of wheat, fruits, and vegetables grown in temperate 
climates and products with high protein content. Although it is worth noting that 
starch-bearing root crops are still important for Asian countries, they are now 
used not directly as food but as feed for livestock (Fuglie 2004, 188).
Although in Europe wheat is an inferior good and is being pushed out of 
the consumer basket as incomes increase, in Asia the traditional rice is replaced 
with wheat, which becomes a priority food product. Of course, wheat in Asia 
is consumed in an indirect form (bread, pastries, pizza, pasta, etc.) (Pingalli 
2006, 284). Thus, countries that have traditionally imported rice will shift their 
demand towards wheat, causing a transformation of world trade flows and the 
redistribution of key forces in the market. Therefore, according to the FAO (2018), 
whereas China accounted for 2.81 percent of total U.S. wheat exports in 1986, 
that figure had risen to 5.21 percent by 2013.
Figure 3 shows the volume of imports of rice and wheat by all Asian 
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countries from 1961 to 2013. According to this data, over the past fifty years the 
total volume of imported rice has not grown as much as the volume of purchased 
wheat, and the gap between these values has increased by eighteen times.
The transformation of food consumption in Southeast and East Asian 
countries can be divided into two phases: the diversification of diet caused by 
Bennet’s Law and the Westernization of the diet as a consequence of globalization. 
Urbanization also played a huge role, as the urban population has more access to 
non-traditional food products provided by large supermarkets, restaurants, etc. 
(Pingalli 2006, 282).
Pingalli (ibid., 283) identifies five changes in the demand for food in 
Southeast and East Asia: (1) a decline in per capita consumption of rice; (2) 
an increase in per capita consumption of wheat and commodities containing 
wheat; (3) an increase in the caloric content of products consumed; (4) increased 
consumption of temperate products; and (5) the increasing popularity of products 
that are easy to prepare.
Pingalli links the first of these changes to Bennett’s Law, and the following 
four with the Westernization of Asian consumption. However, we are inclined 
to reconsider Pingalli’s point of view and attribute the third change (an increase 
in the caloric content of the diet) to the consequences of Bennett’s Law. We 
believe that the commitment to vegetable foods in a number of Asian countries—
that is often attributed to historical and cultural factors—was, in fact, caused 
by their populations’ low level of income for a long period of time. In addition, 
the increase in their incomes has affected the change in diet more than has the 
influence of the Western culture of food consumption.
Table 2 provides data on the breakdown of crop and livestock product 
Figure 3. The Import of Rice and Wheat by Asian Countries (Unit: million tonnes)
Source: FAO (2018)
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Table 2. The Balance between Crops and Livestock Products by Regions (Unit: kcal/person/day)
1961 1970 1980 1990 2000 2013
World Total (kcal/person/day) 2200 2398 2496 2635 2725 2884
Crops 1862 2032 2107 2220 2270 2051
Livestock products 338 366 389 415 455 411
Livestock products share 15% 15% 16% 16% 17% 17%
Africa Total (kcal/person/day) 2027 2130 2223 2267 2347 2455
Crops 1871 1964 2040 2092 2173 2269
Livestock products 156 167 184 175 174 186
Livestock products share 8% 8% 8% 8% 7% 8%
North America Total (kcal/person/day) 2875 3025 3165 3440 3711 3727
Crops 1859 2034 2194 2475 2704 2711
Livestock products 1016 990 971 965 1007 1017
Livestock products share 35% 33% 31% 28% 27% 27%
South America Total (kcal/person/day) 2304 2457 2650 2580 2782 2886
Crops 1890 2031 2170 2102 2174 2253
Livestock products 415 426 480 477 608 632
Livestock products share 18% 17% 18% 18% 22% 22%
Asia Total (kcal/person/day) 1805 2069 2200 2443 2606 2668
Crops 1695 1927 2019 2191 2244 2266
Livestock products 110 142 181 253 362 402
Livestock products share 6% 7% 8% 10% 14% 15%
Europe Total (kcal/person/day) 3050 3262 3343 3374 3249 3406
Crops 2285 2370 2370 2371 2348 2464
Livestock products 765 892 973 1003 901 942
Livestock products share 25% 27% 29% 30% 28% 28%
Oceania Total (kcal/person/day) 3016 3108 3027 3140 3000 3182
Crops 1836 1949 1988 2051 2065 2160
Livestock products 1180 1159 1039 1089 935 1022
Livestock products share 39% 37% 34% 35% 31% 32%
China Total (kcal/person/day) 1469 1887 2206 2612 2908 2981
Crops 1411 1772 2029 2299 2335 2342
Livestock products 58 115 177 313 572 639
Livestock products share 4% 6% 8% 12% 20% 21%
Source: FAO (2018)
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consumption among the world’s major population groups. The first salient feature 
here is the 27 percent increase in the global per capita kcal consumption from 
2,200 in 1961 to 2,796 in 2013. At the same time, Asia, where we see a 48 percent 
increase, maintained its leading position in kcal consumption. And in China, the 
average intake of food energy doubled during this period.
The balance between crops and livestock products in the global population’s 
daily food intake is an issue of particular interest. According to Table 2, the 
percentage of livestock products rose from 15 percent to 17 percent around the 
world. However, this index has remained unchanged at 7 percent for the last fifty 
years in Africa. We also note a decrease from 35 percent to 27 percent in North 
America and an increase in South America and in Europe from 18 percent to 22 
percent and from 25 percent to 27 percent respectively. In Australia and Oceania, 
this index dropped from 39 percent to 32 percent, while in Asia it rose from 6 
percent to 15 percent. The share of livestock in daily food intake grew most in 
China, increasing from 4 percent to 21 percent.
Unlike in developed countries, the sale of food products increases 
dramatically in the developing regions of the world, primarily in Asia. In 2009, 
for example, ninety-two multinational food trade corporations operated in 
Europe, eighty-four in the United States, forty-six in Asia, ten in South America, 
and eight in Africa. By 2015, the number of such corporations had dropped to 
eighty-four in Europe and eighty-two in the United States, remained constant in 
Africa and South America, and risen to fifty-nine in Asia (Deloitte 2017).
As multinational corporations expand, they acquire an ever wider variety 
of food products, thereby stimulating developing countries to add items to the 
market basket that had formerly been limited when local companies dominated 
the market.
Following the trend set by those living in developed countries, the people 
of developing countries now demonstrate greater loyalty to products labeled 
as “convenient,” “natural,” or “high-quality,”—although one can find the 
“convenience” label on 27 percent of products in Japan (a high-income state), 12 
percent in Mexico (a middle-income country), and on only 6 percent in Egypt (a 
low-income state). This is due to the lower cost of the time required for cooking 
in the lowest-income states (Regmi, Takeshima, and Unnevehr 2008, iv).
The results of the research below are also quite demonstrative. One can find 
labels indicating good-for-health components (such as vitamins or minerals) 
on 51 percent of Indonesian products (a low-income country), 33 percent 
of Hungarian products (a middle-income country) and on just 27 percent of 
Japanese products (a high-income country). This is because the citizens of high-
income countries a priori believe that the products they buy contain healthy 
ingredients and focus more carefully on the absence of noxious impurities and 
chemical additives (ibid.).
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Food Security of the Korean Peninsula
The growth of food prices in Asia in the early twenty-first century reflects the 
confluence of a number of factors: urbanization and rising prosperity—both 
of which bring more diversified food demands; a tighter linkage between food, 
energy, and financial markets; adverse weather; declining growth in agricultural 
productivity; and, during the peak of the crisis, ill-advised policy reactions by 
major food exporting and importing countries (ADB 2013, 11).
As a result of a growth in crops, livestock, and fisheries production over the 
past two decades, the FAO estimates that average dietary energy supply adequacy 
increased by about 20 percent in East and Southeast Asia.  Because of this 
growth, only one country in the region, North Korea, now has total food supplies 
inadequate to meet people’s average dietary needs. Thus, the prevalence of stunted 
physical development remains high in North Korea (32 percent) (FAO 2015, 18).
Russia has provided millions of dollars worth of food aid to North Korea in 
recent years, including nearly half of the country’s grain imports (50 mln tonnes) 
(ibid.; Toloraya 2014).
The major part of Russian exports to North Korea in the first quarter of 2015 
consisted of the following product types (Mishin 2016):
•  mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; 
mineral waxes (90.8 percent)
•  fish and crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates (3.9 percent)
•  wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal (2.7 percent)
•  oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds, and fruit; industrial or 
medicinal plants; straw and fodder (0.5 percent)
•  furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed 
furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; 
illuminated signs, illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings (0.4 
percent)
•  sugars and sugar confectionery (0.4 percent)
•  products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten (0.2 percent)
•  man-made staple fibers (0.2 percent)
Russia is becoming a very important food trade partner for the Korean 
Peninsula. The table below shows that the quantity of food imported from Russia 
has been growing over the last twenty years (with the exception of the last two 
years).
The recent decline can be explained by the consequences of the “Ukrainian 
crisis” that have affected the old international trade system and aggravated the 
transformation of the global food market. The United States, Canada, Australia, 
Norway, and the European Union (EU) imposed several sanctions on the Russian 
economy. Russia responded by banning food imports from those countries. 
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Because Russia was highly dependent on food imports from the United States, 
Europe, and Australia, and imported those foodstuffs in the most logistically 
efficient way, when the sanctions were imposed there were only two ways of 
coping with the problem: by increasing domestic production (a lengthy process), 
or substituting those foods with more expensive imports from other countries. 
Relatively few foods have been included in the Russian countersanctions. 
Of those, 14.7 percent are fruits and vegetables and 13.3 percent are fish. 
Chicken meat accounts for only 7.9 percent, but actual dependency is higher 
because Russia continues to import hatchable eggs. The situation with beef is 
also not overly alarming; Russia had imported only 7.4 percent of its beef from 
“sanctioned” countries. Furthermore, beef is a luxury product in Russia, so 
consumers are willing to pay more for it. Pork is more prevalent in the Russian 
diet, and the country imports only 13.2 percent of this product.  The situation is 
more critical with cheese, for which Russia had depended on the EU and other 
“sanctioned” countries for 33 percent of its supply (Savelyeva 2014). Thanks to 
the re-export of these foodstuffs through Belarus, price increases have remained 
moderate, but this state of affairs cannot last forever. Russia is highly dependent 
on imports of processed foods, so-called “niche products” such as sausage and 
other specialized meat products.
Thus, sanctions have highlighted those sectors that can and should be 
priorities for increasing domestic production and caused a reexamination of 
methods for stimulating domestic agricultural production. In particular, state 
financing now includes new branches devoted to re-establishing Russian breeding 
and genetics programs. 
The Russian government is also expanding a new state program to ensure 
that domestic agricultural products remain competitive on the internal and global 
markets even after sanctions are lifted. Thus, although exports to the two Koreas 
increased continuously, Russia responded to Western sanctions by decreasing its 
overall food exports to mitigate rising domestic food prices. 
Although the share of agricultural products that Russia exported to North 
Korea fell from 10.2 percent in 2015 to 9.4 percent in 2016, there were several 
important changes in the quantities of exported foodstuffs. Flour-and-cereals 
industry products rose by 47 percent and vegetable oils and fats by 437 percent, 
Table 3. Russian Food Exports to the Korean Peninsula (Units: Million USD)
Year 1996 2000 2005 2009 2015
Peninsula total 203.59 122.69 276,57 456.93 866,54
North Korea 0.54 0.04 0.01 6.08 10.46
South Korea 203.05 122.65 276.56 450.85 856.07
Source: Calculated by authors on the basis of data from UNCTAD (2017)
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while the export value of cereals fell by a dramatic 90 percent (Russian Foreign 
Trade 2017).
It is also worth noting that among Russian exports to North Korea, food is 
second only to mineral resources, which account for a 57 percent share (Federal 
Customs Service of Russia 2017). Unfortunately, UN sanctions imposed against 
North Korea in 2017 limited Russia’s ability to export food to that country. 
However, those restrictions are not expected to last long. 
Conclusion
With its huge potential for developing agricultural exports and its other 
advantages, Russia can play a major role in providing food security in North 
Korea. In a world suffering from shortages of both arable land and clean water, 
Russia is rich in both. Russia holds 20 percent of the world’s water resources 
along with 3.3 percent of its farmland and 9 percent of its arable land. At present, 
however, more than 30 million hectares of Russian farmland are not utilized fully 
(Likhacheva, Makarov, and Savelyeva 2010). 
Ironically, Russia benefits from climate change because warming temperatures 
enlarge the areas suitable for growing basic crops and make possible the 
introduction of new and more productive plant varieties. This increases the gross 
yield of crops. In addition, Russia’s logistical cost of exporting food to North 
Korea is very low due to the geographic proximity of the two countries. 
The unique combination of these advantages makes it clear that Russia is 
uniquely positioned to increase food exports to Asia, and especially to North 
Korea—a country where land and potable water are scarce.  An increase in 
Russian exports would also help answer North Korea’s growing demand for food. 
Thus, food should account for a greater share of Russian-North Korean trade, 
creating a win-win situation in which North Korea achieves greater food security 
and Russia diversifies its exports to mitigate its dependency on fossil fuel exports. 
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